INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PAST AND FUTURE
DAVID TOLBERT"

1.

lNTRODUCTLON

Just a few years ago, any discussion of i.nternational criminal
lawl would

have jndecd been brief. lt would speak of the historic

Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribun,�ls wb.ich followed World War II,
m aking various comment:> regarding their groundbreaking nature
and some of the criticisms related t h ereto1

e.g., "victor's justice.
Perhaps there would be some discussion of the tric1ls tl1at followed
"

the Nuremberg Military Tribun�l ("NMT") in which judges from
the victorious

powers participated.

There

might

follow

<m

overview of the develop ments in internationR] hum E\ nitarian law,
particularly the a doption of the G enocide Convention, the 1949
Geneva Convenbons, and related treaties, as well as passing
references to domestic proseculio.n s that applied lhis law.

One

might even make reference to the distant dream of som e type of
perm.anent international criminal court.

Thus, if this article had

been pen ned at the fifteenth anni versa ry of this

foumnl'::; lite, it

would have not only been necessarily short but it also would have
painted

a

dismal

picture

of

n1assive

atrocities

without

any

individual (\CCOttntability f.or these crimes on the international
level.

It would have been fair to say that international criminal

law, with a few notable exceptions, existed only in theory .

Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow, United States Institute o( Peace ("USIP");
formerly United Ne1tions Assistant SL'cretMy·Gener<ll and Special Expert to the
Secretary-Gen�ral on United 1 ations As<>istance tn the Khmer Rouge Trials;
Deputy Chief Prosecutor, lntcrn,1tional Ctiminal Tribunal f(H. the forn1er
Yugoslavia ("ICTY'')i Deputy Registrar, ICTY; Chef de C1binct l(i the Pn2sident,
ICTY; Executive Dircctur, Americ.1n Bnr Association Central Et!ropean and
Eurasian Law Initiative(" ABA-CEEU"). Thl.' \'iews e'pressed bl:rcin <m: th1iSC of
the authe>r alone and not those of USIP.
·

I
While "inteTnational criminal l a w is �cnerJIIv underst<Jod tu me.m the
body of rules that prohibit inlernation::�l c.:ri;1wc;, the ter111 is u�cd here i n its
broadest s�.::nse, with a iocus on the development of mechanisms to .:�ppl_v and
enforce this body of law on the international kvel.
"
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Over the last fifteen years, however, the picture h<.1s changed
dramatically.

The

Nuremberg

and Tokyo trials,

whiie still

important from an historical perspective, arc now a n1uch smaller
part of the story, following the creation of ad hoc international
criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslcwia ("lCTY") and Rwanda
("TCTR") in the 1990s, which haw� tried hundreds of iT'ldividuals
for war crimes, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, crimes
againsl humanity, and genocide.

Their vvork hC!S sp<rwncd other

internationalized courts and tribunals (ofll'n referred to as hybrid
cow:ts

because they use a combination of inlcrnaliOnCll and

national judges, prosecutors, and staff), such as Lhosc conslituted in
Sierra Leone, Cambodia, East Timor, and Kosovo.2

Even more

significantly, many governments from throughout the world caine
together in 1998 to negoti21te and adopt the Treaty of Home, wbich
established the International Crimin<ll Court ("ICC"), a permanent
treaty-based

court,

with much

wider

jurisdiction than

L•ther

international tribunals over war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, and (in theory) the crime of aggression+ The ICC is now
up and runrung, with four situations under investigation and trials
set to begin in 2009.
These are remarkable achievements in a relatively short period
of lime, but as these courts and tribunals h0ve grown and th12ir
pra ctices have developed, difficult issues have naturally arisen.
Some of these are technical in nature and are hardly unexpected,
such as issues relating to what procedures are to be followed both
However, there are also a

during investigations and in trial.

number of other issues with broad implications th3t arc likely to
impact the ICC and possibly other jnternalional courts and
tribunals over the long-term..

These include the emerging ''peace

versus justice" debate, which posits that in certain circumstances
lhc pursuit of juslice can undermine efforts to creste the conditions

for peace.
These debates play out in a polilical context that harkens back
to the "victor's justice'' argument, in that, thus fur, the work of
international courts and tribunals has focused on crimes in the
developing

·world,

primarily

in

situations are in this conbncnt). As

Africa
a

(e1l1

four

of

Lhe

ICC

result, one hears more voices

� r have not added the Special Tribunal fur Lebanon to this list, because as it
is not applying international humanitarian law. Th� interesting case of the State
Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, wl1ich is a hybrid national court trying war crimes,
d\•es not seem to fit into this category either.
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cn tJcJ zing the disparute tt·eatmenl of similar
These

colonialisrn.
warrc1r1t

clS

cr [ mes

and neo

importan t matters in th�mselves and

They may CJlso imply imporlant p raclic,ll

d isc u ssion.

difficulties,

arc
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the ICC and other international courts and tribun,1ls

h<we no coercive powers of their own and depend primurily on the
cooperation of slates to obtain evidence, conduct- investigations,

and make arrests. These tensions, and how lhcv ;:ne resolved or
not resolved, will play an important r01L' in th e cffic(lcy o f
intcrnation<1l crirnit1al law in the future.
is�LH':'S, and

,1

ln term i ngled with these

possible sol ution to some of tbc.:·. pro blems that C\re

currently being

fc:�ced, is the question of what the exact relationship

h"tween intcrnCitional C\nd domestic courts slwuld be.
In other
vvords1 using the language of the ICC Sta tute, what does
. ,, reall y mean.''
II cumpI�:mentc1r1ty
-r
TlK:se ,1re some of

tbe critical

issues

thnt

the

lCC

(and

intcrnCltion:�l criminal law generally) faces today, c1nc.l its response
to these ch,1llengcs will be crucial as we enter the next phase of
dc\'\.�lopmcnt in this field.

Will international

c rim i nal

law see

consoli dRtion of its rapid development over the post fi[teen yea rs?
Or, will we see possible retrcnchn1ent and cmolher period , no
doubl less extreme than the long gap between the NMT and the
establishn1ent

of

the

lCTY,

where

tbese

institutions

and

international criminal law take a back seat and fail to live up to
their promise?
This is the landscape with which practitioners and interested
parties in the field of international criminal law must grapple in
the coming years.
'I

2 ..l

THE PAST: DiSTANT AND RECE\IT

Fru111 Nurc111bag tu t/u; lCTY

As noted above, inter national crinlinal lcrw has developed at a
rapid rale over the last fifteen years.

Prior to the establishment of

few developments on the
intcrnationc11 �1l,1ne in the appli cation of that ]aw in the wake of the
the

lCTY

in

1993,

there

were

:Jec R('mc St;-�tute of the International Criminal Court, arts. t, 17(1)(a), July
90 (�tilting the1t the JCC is iJ1tend0d to "complement"
natium1l jurisdictions, and "d case is inadmissible [before the lCC] where [t)he
case is being investigated nr prosecuted b y a state which has jurisdiction over it,
t1nless the state i� unwilling or unable genuinely to (any out the investigation or
17, 1998, 21�7 U.f'J,TS.

pros�cutit'ln").
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Nuremberg ancll'okyo Tribunals. However, it is worth noting that
these tribunals, p8rticularly Lhe NMT,4 were a
in that senior poli tical and

tnilitary leaders
lar gely seen as

in proceed in gs that were

m.a jor

breakthrough

were brought to justice,
fair und in accordance

wilh applicable st"ndards, for atrocities that they had ordered,
di rected , or committed.

Jn addition

were enunc ia teLi either in the iT

,

important IL"gal principles

founding

.

documents (a:: was the

case with the London Charter) or by the

tribLHl.Jis themselves;
including establishing cri n'les agajnst humanity, which be c r1me Cl
cornerstone of intt·rnational humanitarian law, one! striking down
the defense of sup<:rior orders.
fbus,

these

prL)::iecutions

and

related

rroceed ings

under

Control Council Order No. 10, in which intcrnationc�l judges and
proscclttors particip<1tcd in otherwise national trials, represen ted
signific

mt

c

.:1

step forw.:1rd in creating a fr<lmework of interni'llional

crimin;:d law, partint larly given past efforts Lhat fc1ilcd i.n this
rcgcud (such as lhc Versaill es Treaty which provided
prose cution of Kaiser Wilhelm 11).

for the

However, t11ese efforts were

subject lo a number of criticisms as well. These trials were decried
by some as "victor's justice

i_n that the crimes of those who lost

,"

the vvars vvere adjudged by representatives of those who won, with
American, french, British, and Russian judges si tting in judgment
of Ge rman officers, but no one from the victorious allies was
subject to an y similar iustice mechanisms.
that

ex

post fnctv laws and

Another criticism was

legal p rin ciples

Nure rnbe rg and Tokyo in that,

were

applied at

for example, "crirnes against

humanity'' did not exist as a binding legal concept prior to the
adoption of the London Charter.
While these and other criticisms have at least sorne
nonetheless the e1chievemcnts of N uremberg were

v alidity,
ta ngible t1nd

impo rta n t The trials sho vv ed that leaders could be held to account
for their lawless acts and

tl1 at

,

at least in the face of mass

a. t T

ocities

the intcrnation<'tl community could establish judicial mechanisms
that were seen as fair in tbem.selves. This was a result far superior
to either lookjng the other vvay or si rnply executing these lee�dcrs as
Winston Churchill, among others, advocated.

I For

J

\'cli'iety ot rcasuns, the To!-:yo Tt·ibun<ll is subject to more sust0ined

Sec, e.g., R. john Pritchard, The
ond lis Colltei11J.IMI1r}i Re�uwm.:t'S, 1·19
MILL. I<EV. 25 (1995) (comparing the IMT for the Far East with other international
and justified critici"m than its counterpart.
lntL'mntioual Military Tribunal for till! Far £a5/

courts).
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Despite the work of the 1 MT, the following almost fifty years
did not see any establishn1ent of further international criminal
tribun.als or courts.

There were irnportant developments in the

law, which included the adoption of the Geneva and Genocide
Conventions as well as a number of other groundbreaking treaties,
including, the Torture Convention, and there were some scattered
domestic prosecutions based on these laws and principles, such as,
the Adolph Eichmann trial.

ln the 1980s and 1990s, a number of

countries, prirnarily in Latin America but also in South Africa,
employed non-judicial mechanisms, in the form of Truth and
Reconciliation

Commissions,

to address

accountability

issues.

While these mcchcmisms varied in terms of their procedures, they
did not attribute criminal responsibility, so they are technically
outside the scope of internationa.l criminal law.s Nonetheless, they
did represent a growing public movement and awareness that
mass atrocities in any society must be addressed, and can not
simply be swept under the proverbial carpet and ignored.

In this

sense, these mechanisms are important in setting the stage for the
next developments in international criminal law.
This next stage came with the creation of the ICTY in 1993 by
the United Nations Security Council.

2.2.

Tlze ad !we Tribunals and other l!lterrzationalized Courts

During the early 1990s, a series of wars broke out in what was
the unraveling country of Yugoslavia. The savagery of these wars
was on full display on international television stations, such as
CNN, giving immediacy to the numerous atrocities committed
during the conflicts. The United

ations and the European Union

struggled to deal with the unfolding humanitarian disaster and to
bring an end to the conflicts, which only stopped in 1995 with the
Dayton Accords (the Kosovo conflict was to emerge in 1999 and
another conflict in Macedonia in 2001). In the midst of the conflict,
the United Nations Security Council decided to create the ICTY the
first international tribunal since Nuremberg and Tokyo.
The Security Council acted pursuant to its powers under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which provides it with
mandatory and legally binding powers to take steps to ensure
peace and security. By acting in this mC\nner, the Security Council,

s It should be noted that in South Africa, there was a judicial effect in that
anmesty was granted in exchange for truthful testimony.
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ti·h�ory, clo thed tl1e fCTY with n1 c1nd atory and
binding legc:\1 powers. Moreov er, in the lCTY Stc1t ut c; the Se cu rity
Co uncil provided tha.t t he l CTY had primac y over n a tion a l courts;
< l authorLties had to give way to the
that is, nationetl p rosecu t ori l
ICTY when the latler dt>cided to ex erc is e its jmisdiction. Th e ICTY
was also g iven a broJd n.1nndate OVt'r all vvnr crimes, crimes agai n s t
hu mani ty / c"lnd genocide ( but not C'lggressiCln) in the te rrito ry o f t he
forme r Y ugo sla via frun.1 199"1 forw<m::l. The court itselr is c urrent ly
at least in IPgJI

located in rhe Hague, t\ethcrlands.
esta blish ment

The

of

tht:>

fCTY

Web

a

revolutionary

only due to the sw c�pin g powers it WC\S given
over n atio n al authorities, but <1lso bcc.:tuse lhe rri buna l was a truly
i n ter nat ional court: created by the United N(ltions, v.rilh j udges,
prosecutors, and s taff recruited fr01n all pmts of the world. This
la tter a pproa ch addressed, e�t least in part, the past arguments of
I low�v er, a new argument, arose:
VVhy
'' vict or' s justice."
Y u go sla vi a and not other countries? Shou ld 110t o the r perpetrators
be subject to justice? Was a fumiwmenta I prin c iple of justice being
i gno red by the limitation of tbe T rib unal to a speci fi c country and a
s pecific time pe riod?

development, not

Even horn a more practical level, the ICTY faced enormous
obstacl es.

While it had

significan t powers on paper, i t was n ot

clear how it was to con d uct investigations and rnake a rres ts il1. a
war zone, pcHticularly when it had no
coercion.

p olice force or mea ns of

This n':!alit-v became starker �whe11 Tribunal offj c ial s
.I

C o unc il unwilling to tclke more than
c
t
o
ry
steps
lo
enforce
its orders and requests. Given these
er
fun
p
r ea lities, many vievved the !CTY as simply a '1 fig lea f' for the
Securily Council's t21 ilme to c-1ct to stop the conflict.
Shortly afte r the cre<�tion of the lCTY, genocide occurred in
R.v
\ a..n da where s o n1c ROO,OOO Tutsis <:md mod erate Hutus were
killed in a few sh or l months in 1994. The Security Council a cted
a gain pursuant lo its p Ov\' ers under Chaplcr VII of t he United
N 21 tions Charter Glnd created the ICTR, which has a similar
mandate and s t ruc ture clS ICTY, wi th jurisdiction limi ted to
Rwanda in 1994.
It is currently lo..:ated in Arusha, Tanzcmia. It
faced many of the Senne iss ues as t he lCTY in terms of lack of
coercive powers, c"ll beit in a differ en t cont ext.
These ad hoc r ri b ullc.li S have held reed achievements; where
m any individllals h ave been br ought to j ust i ce, a11d they h 3 ve been
fmmd

the

Security

able to overcome many obstacles. For example, th e lCTY has been
able to arrest or otherwise dispose of the cases of all b ut lwo of the
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161 individuals it indicted. The tria.ls conducted have been seen to

be fair, a n d many victims have felt a rneasure of justice. The
tribunals have also been able to make international criminal l a w
i n to a tangible area of international lavv a n d have created a strong
cadre of practitioners in th.is emerging field of l a w .
O n the other hand, the tribunals b,wc been subject t o a nqriad
of criticisms. Perhaps the most telling of these i s tha t t h ey are
expensive and slow and have no rea! connection to the affected
com.munities, because they are far a\vay fron1 the locations where
the crimes have been comn1itted.

Moreover, their in1pact on, and

support of, the developm.ent of local

j u d icial

irtfre1structure has

been lirnited.
ln response to these criticisrns, ·which clearly have at least some
merit, the United Nations has ta ken

differen t approach when
mass atrocities have occu.rred in other contexts by creating hybrid
tribunals or cou.rts t ha t are located iu ::;itu. In Sierra Leone, the
0

U n i ted Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone established a
hybrid court in Freetown that applied not only international
htunanitarian law but a l so the domestic crirninal l a w of Sierra
Leone. In Cambodia, a similar model was followed to try the
c ri mes of the Khmer Rouge, although the U.N. posi tio n is much
less robust t h an in Sierra Leone.
Moreover, U N. transitional
.

authorities i n East Timor and Kosovo also followed the hybrid
model by utilizing international judges and prosecutors working

together with national judges and prosccu tors; in the case of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the national auth o ri ti es took a similar course
working closely with the Office of the High Representative.
While each of these tribunals and courts h.Cive positive and
negative attributes, it is clear that the arrangetnents regarding
hybrid courts were intellded to address the probl em of distance by
placing the court in the country where the crimes were comn1itted.
allowed greater access by the 21ffected public to the
proceedings and also aJlo�wed victims to feel closer to the

This

proceedings.
The costs were also substantially reduced by
employing national staff and in lovver cost en vironm en t s than The
Hague. Finally, the hybrid model W<�S an attempt to leverage the
skill s and knowledge of international judges and prosecutors to the
benefi t of their national counterparts viu skills and capacity
building.

Thus, pu t ting the ICC to one side for a moment, a patchwork of
international and internationalized hybrid courts and judicial
institutions have emerged over the last fifteen years. In some
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cases,

they

have

sat

alongside

Commissions (i.e., Sierra Leone).

[Vol.

Truth

and

30:4

Reconciliation

Of course, such a patchwork of

courts does not ansvver the critics' argument that justice is selective
and disparate, but the record of these institutions shows that
justice can be done in a wide range of specific cases. These courts
and tribunals have tried hi gh-ranking senior leaders for violations
of international criminal law, a d evelopment that would h.ave been
unimaginable just a few years ago.

Thus, presidents (Taylor,

Milosevic, Karadzic) and prime ministers (Kambanda), previously
thought to be immune, have been or arc being tried for mass
crimes.

t-,1Ioreover, following the Pinochet case i n the United

Kingdom, it is also clear that doctrines providing for the immunity
oi heads of state have been consigned to the dustbin.

Therefore,

between these international and internationalized courts and the
application of the laws in some states providing for universal
jurisdiction over certain crimes (e.g.,

genocide, crimes against

humanity), internation<'ll criminal law is now an essential part of
the fabric of international law and applied by various international
and domestic courts.
3.

THE ICC AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
While all of the courts and tribunals discussed above have

played

an

in1.portant

role

in

establishing

and

enforcing

international criminal law, the most significant development in the
field has been the creation of the ICC. The negotiation of the Rome
Statute took a number of years to come to fruition and can fairly be
seen as a post-Cold War phenomenon.

It clearly could not have

been est8blished during the Cold War, and, similarly, it would
have been much more difficult for the ICC Treaty to have been
negotiated even a few years later
environment.

in the post-Septentber

11

The Rome Statute arose during a period of post

Cold \Nar optimism and renewed faith in international institutions.
Moreover, the pioneering vvork of the ad hoc Tribunals must also
be recognized, as their work, while fraught with difficulty, had
shown that such institutions could work and conduct fair trials in a

truly international context.
In many respects, the Rome Statute is a conservative document,
�md the powers of tl1e court and the prosecutor are much more
circumscribed than in the ad hoc Tribunals. The ICC prosecutor is
subject to substantial judicial supervision and the court has no
jurisdiction at all unless the domestic authorities are "unwilling or
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unable"

to prosecute the crin1es,

"complementarity" principle.
the situation of the ICTY and
jurisdictions.

vvhich is referred to as the

Therefore, the

ICC is the reverse of

iCTR which have primacy over local

Moreover, while the ICC may obtain jurisdiction i n

several ways, including b y Security Council referral, State Party
referral, or by an investigation by the prosecutor pursuant to his or
her limited

proprio niotu powers in certain circumstances, the

Security Council is in a position to cedi a temporary halt to these
proceedings should it deem it necessary for reasons of peace 2md
security.

There

are a

number of

other

restrictions

on

the

prosecutor's and the court's 21bility to rnount investigations and
proceedings as well, which are in any event limited to natio.nals of
State Parties to the Rome Treaty or to crimes committed in those
countries' territory (except in th:.; case of a Security Council
referral).
The

ICC Statute was overwhelmingly adopted in Rome in 1998,

and it quickly won sufficient approval to come into force as of July

1998.

This was a rem.arkable achievement.

Hm.vever, despite its

widespread acceptance, the ICC was actively opposed by the
United St21tes, which after President CLinton initially signed the
treaty, then (under the Bush Administration) "unsigned" the treaty
and launched an ideological and shameful campaign to undermine
and attack the court. Fortunately, over time U.S. policy appears to
have gradually shifted to an u.nstated tolerance for the ICC with
the United States playing 21 neutral or positive role in the Security
Council's referral of the DMfur situation to the ICC and the
subsequent issues related to the referral. We can hope that a more
positive approach will emerge with the Obama administration and.
that at some point the United States itself will join the ICC.
As the ICC developed as an institution, it has faced, is facing,
and will face a number of difficult issues in the future.
difficulties
cooperation
questions

seem

to

issues;
of

fall

into

(2)

the

selection

of

complementarity

and the

three

Peace

general

versus

prosecutions;

relationship

national judicial authorities.

These

categories:

Justice

debate

and

(3)

between

the

(1)
and

applying
ICC

and

Obviously, the ICC operates in

a

cornpiex political and judicial environment, but these are the issues
that strike me as the primary ones. Given that the ICC is or will be,
with the impending closure of the ICTY and ICTR, the primary
mechanism for the application of international criminal law for the
foreseeable future, we can also say these will, ipso facto, be the
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principal issues (foreseeable at the moment) that vvill arise in the
field of international criminal law.
In tenns of coopera tion, the ICC, like the ad

hoc Tribunals, has

no means of coercion Cit its disposal. Therefore, it must rely on the
cooperation of states and international organizations, for assistance
in carrying out its investigations and making a rrests.

'Without

cooperation from the relevant states, its work can be stymied. One
area where there have already been issues is the h<:1ndling of
confidential

inforrn<�tion from

the

United

Tations

and

other

sources that h<�d been provided to the prosecution but not to the
defense in the

Luhnngo case, leading the trial charnber to threaten

dismissal of the case.

This crisis has novv been averted, but such

technical issues involving cooperation are likely to arise again.
However, in rny view, such problems can be worked through and
are part of the difficulties that international courts dealing with
establishing cases against senior military and political leaders will
always face.
A tnore serious problem. occurs when the national authorities
in the place the crimes were comrnitted refuse cooperation and/ o r
refuse t o make arrests. Tb. e ICTY faced this situation with respect
to Serbia and to a lesser extent with Croatia.

For much of its life,

the ICTY had a long list of fugitives, including n1any senior
leaders, but over time this has been whittled away, primarily as a
result of political and economic pressure exerted by the European
Union.

In the cases

of both Croatia and Serbia, the benefits of

joining the European Union and the drawbacks of not joining were
sufficient to win cooperation, p a rticularly on the issue of arrests.
The ICC is in a more difficult situation: all of its current cases
are in Africa, which does not have a regional set of institutions in
any

way

corn.parablc

to

the

European

Union.

stonewalled in Darfur by the Government of Sudan.

It

is

being

These types

of non-cooperation issues wm always plague the ICC; they will
require patience and cunning on the part of the lCC as well a s
innovative te1ctics a n d strategy.
One strategy that the lCC has embraced in the face of such non
cooperat.ion is the concept of self-referra l - allowing states to refer
their own situations to the ICC.

Thus, in the case o.f Uganda, it

referred the situation regarding the Lord's Resistance A r n1y in its
· territorv
to the ICC.
,

This vvas then followed bv
similar self-

referrals by the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central
African Republic.
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vVhile the ath·action of self-referrals is clear in terms of
cooperation., as the refcrdng state is 1.1bviously pl�:mning to
cooperate w i th lCC if it is willing to refer itself, t h i s process has
been severely criticized on several fronts.l' First, self-referrals were
not the intention of the state referral process established in the
Rome Statute, which provides for one state to refer another ststc.
More importantly, it is argued th21t such self-referral turns
c0mplemcnlarity on its head, as the stutc rather than the court
determines whether it is in a position lo prosecute. fn the Ugc1nda
situation, it is not that the Ugandan courts lack the requisite
capaci ty - the test in the Rome Slatute, but rather that the
governrnent could nol effect an arrest which the ICC was not
created to handle. The lCC thus a l lows such governments to
establish the court's priorities rather them following the norms
established i n the Rome Statute. Finally, it is argued that the self
referring government is, in essence, pointing the finger a t rebel
groups and tl1us trying to avoid an investigation itself a.nd that the
ICC i s caught in this web by agreeing to such self-referrals.
Regsrdless of whether one accepts these arguments, it is dear
that state cooperation problems have led to the novel approach of
self-referrals and t h a t issues of cooperation or non-cooperation w i l l
continue to significantly impact t h e ICC.
A second set of issues arises o u t of the ''Peace versus J u s t ice"
debate, which has emerged from the Uganda and Darfur situations
pending before the ICC. fn essence, it is argued that by insisting
on the primacy of ICC investigati ons, peaceful resolutions of
disputes can be discouraged, as leaders facing war crimes
investigations or charges are u n l i kely to agree to make peace,
Thus, in this
because they have little incentive lo do so.
construction, peace, along with itmocent people and peacekeepers,
can be endangered by a n insistence on j ustice, and, therefore in
some instances j u s t ice efforts must give way to attempts to bring
about peace.
Concerns e1bout such issues led to the inclusion of Article 16 .in
the ICC Statute, which pnwides that the Security Council can cause
the ICC to defer a n investigation or proceedings for a period of one

" See WILLic\t\1 A. SCH:\U:\S, Fir�t Prost!Cittinlls at tile lnlanali!llltll CriJJii11nl Ct•urt,
CRIME..<:; AND 1 -lUi'vlr\:-J RIGHTS: ESSAYS 0� THE Dc,\Tl l Pt:i\:ALTY, }UST:CI:. AND
ACCOUNTABILITY, 375, 392-,!01 (2008) (arguing thnl self-reierr,ll was n.either
cHlticipat�d by the. dr<1fters of the Rome Statute 110r is i t lhe best way for the lCC to
proceed}.
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year, which can be renewed. This provision has been discussed in
the Darfur situation, with considerable support in the Security
Council for such a deferral.
In many ways this debate is based on a faulty premise:
continued failure to address past crimes does not lead to peace b u t
rather t o more conflict. However, one must b e cognizant that there
are a number of not unreasonable voices who have argued that i n
specific s i tuations, pushing for justice at certain stages can
undermine efforts for peace.
While these argun1ents are not
persuasive to this writer, they are arguments that w i l l continue to
arise and w i l l need to be add ressed. Moreover, these lead to
questions about the prosecutor's proper role in determining when
to investigate. I s i t a straightforward legal decision, based solely
on the evidence a n d the gravity of the crimes committed? Or
should, political and pragn1atic considerations, such as the effect
such investigations will have on peace and stability of a country or
region be factored into the equation? While we rnay d isagree w i t h
the idea t h a t justice should ever b e sacrificed, it is clear t h a t these
questions will continue to arise and that they w i l l present a set of
long-term issues that the ICC and proponents o f international
justice will need to contend with.
Another issue that is emerging is that the ICC's four situations
are i n Africa, while other situations such as Chechnya remain
beyond the ICC s reach. This raises a corollary to the "victor's
justice" argument; that is, justice for weak countries a n d not for the
strong. The establishment of the a d hoc Tribunals ,,vith their
limited jurisdictions, of course, raised this issue as well.
The establishment of the ICC has obviously widened the
jurisdiction of international courts well beyond that of the nd hoc
Tribunals, to say nothing of the NMT. Nonetheless, w h i l e many
African sta tes have joined the fCC, nwch of the rest o f the vvorld,
including such powerful countries as the United States, Russia, and
China have not as yet ratified the Rome Treaty. Thus, in some
cases a l leged crimes in weaker countries may end up being
prosecuted, either because those countries have ratified the Rome
Statute or because, as in the case of Darfur, tb.e Security Council
has referred the situation and the country has no right of. veto in
the Security Council. It is, therefore, true that even w i t h the ICC,
citizens of a country with the right of Security Council veto can
and probably do avoid prosecution whereas similar crimes
another country can be and probably have been prosecuted.
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This situation is, of cou rse, a violation of the principle of equal
tn�a tmc n l.

Nonethel ess, it is not

moved from

a

ste� tir si l Llcl tion, as vve have

a

situntion where on ly

a

fe w

ye(trS ngo there was no

possibility of an i nt�rna tiona l prosecn tion to the current si tu a ti on
one

�vvhcrc over

j u ri .;dic tion ,

hundred countries

arc

with more ratifications coming

su b j ec t
Cl,

the

ICC's

t i me passes.

Many

to

of these countries arc si gnifican t powers, incl ud ing the United
Kingdom, France, Brazil, and South AfriCt't.

ThNcfore, given the

nature of the critTICS there is a pers uasi ve arsument thJt we should
not mc1kc "the perfect the enem y of the good " but that more wc,rk
shou ld

go in to achieving an even broadt>r !:->Ctlpc for tbe lCC.
Nonetheless, this w i l l be L1 contin u ing issue th,lt faces the ICC for
th0 foreseeable fu ture .
A broader and

a ddres

s

m.o re

fundamental issue thilt the ICC needs to

is thCit of complementarity. As noted above, u nder the ICC

Statute, Lhc rcc

Gl ll

only exercise i ts

j u risd iction

in cases where lhe

nilli0nal au tho rit ies cannot or wi l l not investigdtc and prosecute
thl' applicable
complemen t,

c rimes .

Hence

the p urpose of the ICC is

not supersede national juri�d ictions.

to

Thus, the court

m11st make a decision whether this complementarity pr inc i ple he�s
been respec ted before the situation or

c as e

is n d m issible a t the

rcc.

This question invo lves an application of the releva nt legal
pri nciples and

rules. However, complementarity raises ano ther set

of questions: what is the ICC's role w i th res pect to

assi sting

slates

in bringing thei r j u d icial systems up to a standard where they can
prosecute c ri mes under the lCC Statute?

Moreover, how are

seriou s crin1es that do not meet the p rosecu tor' -; g ra v ity threshol d
req u i rem ents to be hClndled?

For exam p l e, the fCC might well

dcc ick Lo prosecu te the general , but wha t hE1ppens to t h e capt-a in
who

a lso

c om m i tted serious cri m es?

These difficult issues of complementarity, which some call
" pos iti ve complementarity" have yet to be addressed. While this is
understandable given the sign ifica n t prob lems fc1cing the ICC
these are issues thal arc likely to become more pressing as the ICC
conducts more investi gations and obtains

m o re

and more evidence

What relationship will exist between nationcll
prosec uting authori ties ciJ1d courts and the ICC?

c1 n d information.

There e�re some i n d i c a t io ns from tlw ICTY
complementarity" might work.

how such

"

pos it i ve

The lCTY ft..
) LJ nd that its case load

was too great, particularly in view of its pla ns to tinish its wor k i n
a timely maru1er.

j u d i cia l
confl ic t and

As the

recovered following Lhe
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l CTY transferred <1 number of low and m id-level cases to national
courts, which dt:'veloped special ized war crimes chambers to deal
with these cases. Most of these cases went to the Ste�le Court of
Bosnia-[ Ie.rzeguvina, \-Vhich ilst'l r is a national hybrid court, <:llld,
vvilh n1onitoring by the Orga n ization for Security and Coopera tion
in Eu rope, the experiment vvas successful. Moreover, other
methods of cooperation vvere developed to provide files, dossiers,
and investigative mL1tcrials to national prosecutors to develop their
own cases. These prosecutors were also given access to the ICTY
prost:cu tor's non-confidential electronic databases, a nd t rn i n i n g
was provided lo prosecutors and judges.
While the situation in the former Yugoslavia is quite different
from those w h ich the ICC is currently investigating, and these
methods were developed more i n reaction to time pressure th.m <l
positive vision oi complementarity, they are instructive cm d bear
further study. l n clny C\'enl, i f lhc> ICC is to m<:1ke a broader in'Lpact
than simply holding a limited number of trials in The Hague, i t
will need to develop this concept o f "positive complen1entarity."
In my view, it is the key question for international crimimd l<:1w
and international justice generally during the next phase of irs
impx-essive forward march.
-!.

CONCLliDlNG REMARKS

The above discussion merel .·v outlines this author's views of the
principal developments in the field of international crimi nal law
over this journnl's life, slightly stretching beyond its thirty years
because of the long f21llow p e riod between tbe NMT and the
este�blishm.cnt of the fCTY. \1\fhat is clear is that this f.ie]d of .law has
rocketed from being a matter of theory, dreams, a nd hopes to the
forefront of intern.1tional !e�w. This fact no doubl stctns frnm ,,
variety of developments cotu1ected both to the end of lhc Cold War
and to mass commLmicc1tions ( the "CNN effect''), but also springs
from something n1ore ete rn a l : tl1e desire to say 1'no" to those who
would visit m21ss destruction nnd mjsery on th ei r fel lo"" human
beings. While many i ss u es cmcl problems lie ahead for this field of
law, thankfu l l y there is no t ur n i n g back.
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